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We present an automated technique that combines fault injection with model checking to 
verify fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability in multi-agent systems. We deﬁne a 
general method for mutating a multi-agent systems model representing correct behaviour 
by injecting faults into it, and speciﬁcation patterns based on temporal-epistemic formulas 
to reason about the correct and faulty behaviours of the mutated model. The technique is 
implemented in a toolkit that can be used for injecting automatically faults into a multi-
agent systems program. The usefulness of the methodology is demonstrated by injecting a 
number of faults into a model of the IEEE 802.5 token ring LAN protocol and analysing the 
protocol’s fault tolerance, by verifying a number of temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction
The multi-agent systems (MAS) paradigm [1] has been employed successfully in several disciplines studying systems 
whose core components, or agents, autonomously interact with one another, engaging in communication, negotiation, co-
ordination, etc. One reason for the popularity of MAS formalisms in many scenarios is the availability of rich modal logics 
to analyse the behaviour of agents, including the ability to reason about various notions of knowledge of the agents in the 
system [2].
In recent years several studies have been conducted to ensure that the MAS paradigm can be adopted for situations in 
which the system must continue to operate correctly under degraded conditions, such as the event of a failure within one 
or more of the agents. As a result, several fault tolerant architectures for MAS have been proposed (see, e.g., [3–7]). The 
strategies utilised by these architectures include replicating agents [3] to facilitate overall system tolerance to agent failures, 
and allowing agents to diagnose faults so that they can communicate and co-ordinate to recover from them [5–7]. While 
these strategies have been proven useful in a range of scenarios, they fall short of providing practically usable tools and 
techniques for certifying the correct behaviour of fault tolerant MAS architectures.
Formal methods and, in particular, model checking [8] are becoming increasingly popular for verifying the correct be-
haviour of systems (see, e.g., [9,10]). Model checking has previously been used to verify fault tolerant properties of a system 
(see, e.g., [11]), including recoverability [12], i.e., recovery from faults, and diagnosability [13], i.e., establishing whether a 
fault can be correctly detected from the observable events of the system [14]. Recently, a number of tools have been devel-
oped by applying fault injection [15] to a correctly behaving system and using model checking to verify correct operation of 
* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: a.lomuscio@imperial.ac.uk (A. Lomuscio).http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ic.2016.10.007
0890-5401/© 2016 Published by Elsevier Inc.
JID:YINCO AID:4228 /FLA [m3G; v1.190; Prn:8/11/2016; 13:19] P.2 (1-28)
2 J. Ezekiel, A. Lomuscio / Information and Computation ••• (••••) •••–•••that system under degraded conditions [16,9,11,17]. Techniques that allow automation when injecting faults into the system 
model are particularly attractive to non-experts in veriﬁcation due to the high level of usability implied by the automatic
nature of both the fault injection and the veriﬁcation process [9]. Unfortunately, due to their modelling formalisms and sole 
support of temporal logic [18] as a speciﬁcation language, these tools are not directly applicable for verifying MAS since their 
speciﬁcations involve rich, AI-based primitives, such as knowledge, beliefs, desires and intentions. AI-based speciﬁcations 
have been shown to be useful beyond
Contribution: In this article we present an automated technique for verifying fault tolerance properties of MAS. A key 
feature of the technique we put forward is that it supports the reasoning about epistemic properties of the system. We show 
that, in addition to its widely discussed suitability for agent-based system, this further provides a natural and expressive 
language for expressing various notions of diagnosability. We ground this work on the MCMAS model checker [19], a model 
checker tailored to MAS speciﬁcations.
More speciﬁcally, we combine automatic fault injection techniques with MCMAS to introduce a general method for 
mutating a MAS model representing its correct behaviour by injecting faults into it. A mutation is an update to a MAS 
model in which the behaviour of one or more agents is altered. The mutated model is veriﬁed against temporal-epistemic 
speciﬁcations to reason about the correct and faulty behaviours of the MAS, in order to assess properties of fault tolerance, 
recoverability, and diagnosability. A noteworthy feature of the technique is the expressiveness in the speciﬁcations supported 
and its high level of automation. To evaluate the methodology we introduce a toolkit for injecting automatically faults into 
a MAS program for analysis with MCMAS. We report the results obtained by evaluating the IEEE 802.5 token ring LAN 
protocol in the context of its fault tolerance mechanisms that employ distributed diagnosis of faults to facilitate recovery 
from them.
The rest of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we provide the necessary background on model checking, 
faults, diagnosability, interpreted systems, and MCMAS. In Section 3 we introduce a method of automatic fault injection in-
cluding failure modes and MAS model mutation via fault injection. In Section 4 we introduce a library of temporal-epistemic 
speciﬁcation patterns to reason about fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability. In Section 5 we introduce a toolkit 
for automatic fault injection. In Section 6 we describe the IEEE 802.5 token ring LAN protocol, and present results relating 
to its temporal-epistemic properties of fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability, as obtained in the methodology 
presented. In Section 7 we discuss related work and in Section 8 we conclude and put forward future work.
2. Background
Model checking [8] is a widely adopted technique for systems veriﬁcation. In model checking the system S considered 
for veriﬁcation is represented by a logical model MS encoding the behaviour of the system as computational traces. In this 
approach a speciﬁcation of a property P is expressed by means of a logical formula ϕP . The model checker establishes 
whether or not MS satisﬁes ϕP (formally, MS  ϕP ). The satisfaction relation is implemented as a decision procedure, the 
automatic nature of which makes model checking attractive for the purpose of veriﬁcation.
Model checking tools used for reactive systems such as SPIN [20], SMV [21], and NuSMV [22] express ϕP as a temporal 
logic formula [18]. Model checking tools for multi-agent systems such as MCMAS [19], Verics [23] and MCK [24] support 
richer speciﬁcations including epistemic logics [2]. Epistemic logic has long been advocated as an expressive and natural 
language to capture properties of MAS.
2.1. Model checking, faults, and diagnosability
Traditionally, model checking has been applied to provide assurances about the correct behaviour of the system. How-
ever, the analysis of safety-critical systems involves reasoning about the consequences of faults. This has been achieved by 
comparing correct system runs and runs in which faulty behaviour is injected by means of model checking tools [16,9,11,
17].
Reasoning about faulty behaviour is also a recent topic in MAS. Faulty behaviour in MAS has been modelled and reasoned 
about for systems such as transmission protocols [25] and web services [26]. However, an automatic method for injecting 
faulty behaviour into MAS has not yet been developed; therefore, faulty behaviour is normally introduced manually when 
modelling a system.
The general problem of fault diagnosis has received considerable attention since the late 80s (see, e.g., [27]). The property 
of diagnosability can be analysed by establishing whether a fault can be correctly detected from the observable events of 
the system, and is typically deﬁned by saying that a fault is diagnosable if there are a ﬁnite number of observations after 
the occurrence of the fault that correctly identify it [14]. For systems in which accurate fault diagnosis is critical, model 
checking has been used to verify this property [13]. However, in this approach distributed diagnosability is not considered, 
and the faulty behaviour of the system is modelled by hand, thereby hampering applications.
2.2. Interpreted systems and MCMAS
Interpreted systems [2] are a popular semantics for temporal-epistemic logic. Below we brieﬂy summarise the framework 
of interpreted systems popularised in [2] to model MAS. We follow standard naming conventions and characterise each agent 
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in compliance with a local protocol Pi : Li → 2Acti specifying which actions may be performed in a given state. In this 
formalism the environment in which agents live is modelled by means of a special agent E. Associated with E are a set of 
local states LE , a set of local actions ActE , and a local protocol P E . A tuple g = (l1, . . . , ln, lE) ∈ L1 × . . . × Ln × LE , where 
li ∈ Li for each i and each lE ∈ LE , is a global state describing the system at a particular instant of time.
The evolution of the agents’ local states is described by a transition function ti : Li × Act1 × . . . × Actn × ActE → Li which 
returns the next local state for agent i given the current local state of the agent, the current action by the environment 
as well as all the agents’ actions. Similarly, the evolution of the environment’s local states is described by a function tE :
LE ×Act1× . . .×Actn×ActE → LE , returning the next environment state given the current round of actions. It is assumed that 
in every state agents evolve simultaneously. The evolution of the global states of the whole system is described by a function 
t : G × Act → G , where G ⊆ L1 × . . . × Ln × LE is the set of global states for the system reachable from a set of initial global 
states I ⊆ G , and Act ⊆ Act1 × . . . × Actn × ActE is the set of enabled joint actions. The function t is deﬁned as t(g, a) = g′
if and only if for all i, ti(li(g), a) = li(g′) and tE (lE (g), a) = lE (g′), where li(g) denotes the i-th component of global state g
(corresponding to the local state of agent i). Finally, an interpreted system includes a set of atomic propositions AP together 
with a valuation function V ⊆ AP × G . Formally, we deﬁne an interpreted system as the tuple
IS = 〈(Li,Acti, Pi, ti)i∈{1,...,n}, (LE ,ActE , P E , tE), I, V 〉
Interpreted systems can be used to interpret speciﬁcations in the temporal-epistemic logic CTLK, whose grammar we 
introduce below:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | EXϕ | AGϕ | E(ϕUϕ) | Kiϕ |EΓ ϕ | CΓ ϕ | DΓ ϕ
In the grammar above p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition; EXϕ represents that there is a global next state of computation in 
which ϕ holds; AGϕ means in all sequences of global states (or, runs, see below) ϕ holds; E(ϕUψ) expresses that there 
exists a run in which ϕ holds until ψ holds; Kiϕ expresses that agent i knows ϕ , EΓ ϕ represents that everybody in group 
Γ knows ϕ , CΓ ϕ means that it is common knowledge in group Γ that ϕ , and DΓ ϕ expresses that it is distributed knowledge 
in group Γ that ϕ . Distributed knowledge represents the epistemic state the group would be in if the agents in the group 
were able to combine their individual epistemic states. We refer the reader to [2] for details on this and related epistemic 
concepts widely discussed in the epistemic logic literature. We also assume the standard rewriting for other CTL operators 
such as AX, EF, AF, EG in terms of the triple here introduced.
Any interpreted system is associated with a model MIS = (W , Rt , ∼1, . . . , ∼n, L) that can be used to interpret any for-
mula ϕ . The set of possible states W is the set G of global states reachable from I through the temporal relation Rt . The 
temporal relation Rt ⊆ W × W is deﬁned by considering the transition function t of the corresponding IS: two worlds w
and w′ are such that Rt(w,w′) if and only if there exists a joint action a ∈ Act such that t(w,a) = w′ . The epistemic accessi-
bility relations ∼i⊆ W ×W are deﬁned by considering the equality of the local components of the global states. Two worlds 
w,w′ ∈ W are such that w ∼i w′ if and only if li(w) = li(w′) (i.e., two worlds w and w′ are related via the epistemic relation 
∼i when the local states of agent i in global states w and w′ are the same [2]). The labelling relation L ⊆ AP ×W is deﬁned 
in terms of the valuation relation V .
Formulae are interpreted in MIS as standard [8,2]. Let π = (w0,w1, . . .) be a run, i.e., an inﬁnite sequence of global states 
such that for all i, Rt(wi,wi+1), and let π(i) denote the i-th world of the sequence (notice that, following our assumptions 
above the temporal relation is serial and thus all computation paths are inﬁnite). We write (M,w)  ϕ to represent that a 
formula ϕ is true at a world w in a Kripke model M, associated with an interpreted system IS. Satisfaction is deﬁned as 
follows.
(M,w)  p iff (p,w) ∈ L,
(M,w) ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that (M,w)  ϕ,
(M,w)  ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff (M,w)  ϕ1 or (M,w)  ϕ2,
(M,w)  EXϕ iff there exists a path π such that π(0) =w, and
(M,π(1))  ϕ,
(M,w)  AGϕ iff for all paths such that π(0) = w, we have (M,π(i))  ϕ,
for all i ≥ 0,
(M,w)  E(ϕUψ) iff there exists a path π such that π(0) =w, and there
exists k≥ 0 such that (M,π(k)) ψ
and (M,π(j))  ϕ for all 0 ≤ j< k,
(M,w)  Kiϕ iff for all w′ ∈ Ww ∼i w′ implies (M,w′)  ϕ,
(M,w)  EΓ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ WREΓ (w,w′) implies (M,w′)  ϕ,
(M,w)  CΓ ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ WRCΓ (w,w′) implies (M,w′)  ϕ,
(M,w)  D ϕ iff for all w′ ∈ WRD (w,w′) implies (M,w′)  ϕ.Γ Γ
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In the deﬁnition above the relation REΓ is deﬁned as the union of the epistemic relations for the agents in Γ : REΓ =
⋃
i∈Γ
∼i; 
the relation RDΓ is deﬁned as the intersection of the epistemic relations for the agents in Γ : RDΓ =
⋂
i∈Γ
∼i; the relation RCΓ is 
the transitive closure of REΓ .
We say that formula ϕ is true in an interpreted system IS, and write IS  ϕ if for all initial states k ∈ I, we have that 
(MIS,k)  ϕ .
MCMAS [19] is a BDD-based model checker for the automatic veriﬁcation of multi-agent systems. It provides ISPL (In-
terpreted Systems Programming Language) as an input language for modelling a MAS and expressing (amongst others) 
temporal and epistemic formulas as speciﬁcations of the system. The structure of an ISPL program allows the local states 
to be deﬁned using boolean, bounded integer, and enumeration variables. ISPL programs are closely related to interpreted 
systems; speciﬁcally, each ISPL program describes a unique interpreted system. MCMAS supports the veriﬁcation for all 
formulas in the language above as well as others.
3. Automatic fault injection
Automatic fault injection is the process of mechanically mutating a correct system model into one that displays a partic-
ular faulty behaviour [16,9,11,17]. In a MAS oriented context, we assume a MAS to be modelled by an interpreted system 
IS; from this we wish to derive an extended faulty system ISF∗ , where F∗ indicates the presence of the mutated faulty 
behaviour in the system. The extended faulty system contains the original behaviours of IS as well as some behaviours 
resulting from the faults. We begin by deﬁning this extension by looking at the types of common faults that occur in sys-
tems. These have been previously deﬁned as failure modes in [9,17]; they are here instantiated in the interpreted system 
formalism and extended by introducing complex timings to co-ordinate the fault with the state and actions of other agents 
in the system.
3.1. Failure modes
Failure modes describe behaviour relating to component failures. Common types of failures in components are those 
such as random, stuck at or inverted faults [9,17], which model faults such as a valve becoming stuck open, or accidentally 
closed. Failure modes can also be used to capture the persistence of faults, such as occurring in every step of the evolution 
of the system, a ﬁxed number of steps, or intermittently [17].
We consider these common types of component failures as the starting point for deﬁning failure modes. We extend them 
to allow for more sophisticated agent based failures by deﬁning faults which replace and skip non-faulty agent behaviours, 
as well as rephrase these in the context of interpreted systems semantics and MAS. Fig. 1 illustrates the types of faults that 
we consider to be injectable into an agent, showing an example of an original transitions between states followed by the 
mutated transitions between states according to the type of fault. Different types of faults are deﬁned for boolean, integer, 
and enumerate variables describing a component of the system.
3.1.1. Boolean faults
Boolean faults represent incorrect evolutions of boolean variables. For example, consider the case where an agent A has 
a boolean variable Varb representing two possible local states F and T , i.e., LA = {F,T}. We deﬁne three faults that can be 
injected into the agent on this variable.
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• Sticking Var to its current value (so that the state remains constant at its current value).
• Randomly setting the value of Varb (arbitrarily choosing one of the states at every tick of the clock).
3.1.2. Integer faults
Integer faults correspond to erroneous evolutions of integer variables. For example, consider the case where an agent A
has an integer variable Vari representing three possible local states; 0, 1, and 2, i.e., LA = {0,1,2}. We deﬁne three faults 
that can be injected into the agent on this variable.
• Ramping down the value of Vari (so that state 2 becomes state 1, state 1 becomes state 0, and state 0 remains at its 
current value).
• Ramping up the value of Vari (so that state 0 becomes state 1, state 1 becomes state 2, and state 2 remains at its current 
value).
• Sticking Vari to its current value (so that the state remains constant at its current value).
3.1.3. Enumerate faults
Enumerate faults express faulty evolutions of enumerate variables. For example, consider the case where an agent A has 
an enumerate variable Vare representing three possible local states; R, Y and G, i.e., LA = {R,Y,G}. In Fig. 1 we illustrate the 
original transitions between these states as those of a traﬃc light evolving from red to yellow to green and back to red, 
where R is the red state, Y is the yellow state and G is the green state. We deﬁne three faults that can be injected into the 
agent on this variable.
• A variable value replace fault denotes a situation where a value v1 of type Vare is updated with a value v2 of type Vare
(in this example v1 and v2 can be R, Y , or G). This fault occurs when some of the correct agent behaviour is skipped. 
Fig. 1 illustrates a traﬃc light that evolves from the green state to the yellow state instead of evolving from the green 
state to the red state by replacing red with yellow (i.e., v1 is R and v2 is Y).
• A variable transition fault denotes a situation where Vare is set to a value v1 of type Vare regardless of the state the 
agent is in. This fault occurs when an agent immediately evolves to a state as a result of a fault. Fig. 1 illustrates the 
faulty behaviour where a traﬃc light evolves to the red state from every state (i.e., v1 is R).
• A variable stuck at select fault occurs when a value v1 of Vare persists whenever the current value of Vare is v1 of type 
Vare . Other values of the variable are allowed to change when the agent evolves. Fig. 1 illustrates the faulty behaviour 
where a traﬃc light is stuck in the red state (i.e., v1 is R). If the traﬃc light is not in the red state, it behaves in a 
non-faulty manner.
3.1.4. Fault persistence
To enhance the expressiveness of the failure types previously described, we allow for the persistence of the faults to be 
varied, such as occurring constantly, randomly, and at a speciﬁc point during a system run. This allows realistic system faults 
to be deﬁned since faulty behaviour in a system may only be intermittent and happen to occur during, before, or after a 
speciﬁc point in time.
In the following we use these failure modes to deﬁne a notion of update from models representing correct behaviour 
into ones encoding faults as well.
3.2. MAS model updates via fault injection
To make our fault injection method automatic, we deﬁne a general way to extend any agent of the system A into a 
faulty agent AF∗ . To do this we introduce a fault injection agent (FI) determining the conditions under which faulty behaviour 
occurs in the faulty agent. For each fault j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} introduced into the mutated interpreted system, a corresponding 
fault injection agent FIj is deﬁned. By separating the fault injector from the resulting mutated agents we obtain clearer and 
more uniform models. As we will see later, a user will be able to select various options pertaining to the occurrence of a 
fault during a system run by manipulating FI.
We stipulate that the faulty behaviour is triggered in the faulty agent whenever the inject action is performed by FI. 
Conversely, the original behaviour is preserved in the faulty agent whenever any action other than inject is performed by 
FI. The inject action is performed according to the local state of the fault injection agent. This is highlighted in Fig. 2 which 
shows the mutation of an agent A containing correct behaviour into a faulty agent AF∗ which contains correct and faulty 
behaviour.
3.2.1. The fault injection agent
The fault injection agent determines the time at which a fault is injected during a system run. To allow for varying fault 
persistence, we deﬁne a fault injection agent that determines that a fault is injected constantly as default with options for 
random (rnd) fault injection, fault injection after and before a random start point (rstt) and a random stop point (rsto), and fault 
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Table 1
Deﬁnition of local states and actions of FI.
Options LFI ActFI
default {nofault, fault_i, fault_ni} {notinject, inject}
rstt ∪ {w_rstt} ∪ {start}
astt ∪ {w_astt}
asto ∪ {stop_ni}
asto, !rsto ∪ {stop_i}
rsto ∪ {stop_ni} ∪ {stop}
rsto,asto ∪ {asto_i}
rsto,asto, rnd ∪ {asto_ni}
Table 2
Deﬁnition of protocol of FI.
Options ActP PFI
default {inject} {(fault_i,ActP ), (nofault, {notinject})}
!rnd ∪ {(fault_ni, {inject})}
rnd ∪ {notinject} ∪ {(fault_ni,ActP )}
rstt ∪ {(w_rstt, {notinject, start})}
astt ∪ {(w_astt, {notinject})}
asto ∪ {(stop_ni, {notinject})}
asto, !rsto ∪ {(stop_i, {notinject})}
rsto ∪ {(stop_ni, {notinject})}
rsto, !asto ∪ {stop}
rsto,asto ∪ {(asto_i,ActP ∪ {stop})}
rsto,asto, rnd ∪ {(asto_ni,ActP ∪ {stop})}
injection after and before a start action occurs1 (astt) and a stop action occurs (asto). Any of these options can be combined 
thereby deﬁning more sophisticated faults. Given any of these faults, FI can be formalised by giving the corresponding local 
states, actions, protocols, and transitions.
We now deﬁne the fault injection agent according to these options. The options column in Tables 1–5 represents that 
all options presented in the column must be selected for the deﬁnition in the table to apply. If an option is preceded by !, 
the option must not be selected for the deﬁnition in the table to apply.
Table 1 deﬁnes the local states and actions of the fault injection agent according to these options. For the default fault 
injection agent we have ACTFI = {notinject, inject}. The actions start and stop are added if random start and stop options are 
set.
The fault injection agent can either be in a state where it is never injecting faults (nofault), has injected or not injected a 
fault at the current tick of the clock (fault_[i,ni]), is waiting for a start condition (w_[astt, rstt]), has injected or not injected a 
fault at the current tick of the clock after a stop action (asto_[i,ni]), or has stopped injecting faults (stop_[i,ni]). For example, 
the local states of a random fault injection agent with a random start are deﬁned as LFI = {nofault, fault_i, fault_ni, w_rstt}.
In the above deﬁnitions _i indicates a state of the agent in which the inject action was performed at the current tick of 
the clock; _ni indicates a state of the agent in which the inject action was not performed at the current tick of the clock. 
Thus, a stop_i state can be reached when a point of a system run is reached in which the agent is no longer injecting faults, 
but a fault has been injected at the current tick of the clock. It follows that the fault injection agent will then evolve to a 
stop_ni state.
Table 2 deﬁnes the fault injection agent protocol PFI according to the options, where the protocol function is rep-
resented for convenience as a relation, i.e., we write PFI(nofault) = {notinject} as (nofault, {notinject}), and use a vari-
able ActP for brevity. For the default fault injection agent we have that PFI(nofault) = {notinject}, PFI(fault_i) = {inject}, 
1 Start and stop actions are actions executed by any agent.
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Deﬁnition of transition relation of FI.
Options Target state Transition condition
astt fault_ni w_astt and STA
astt, rstt w_astt w_rstt and ActFI = start
!astt, rstt fault_ni w_rstt and ActFI = start
!asto fault_i (fault_i or fault_ni) and ActFI = inject
!asto, rnd fault_ni (fault_i or fault_ni) and ActFI = notinject
asto fault_i (fault_i or fault_ni) and ACTFI = inject and !SPA
asto, rnd fault_ni (fault_i or fault_ni) and ACTFI = notinject and !SPA
asto, !rsto stop_i ((fault_i or fault_ni) and SPA) and ActFI = inject
stop_ni stop_i
asto, !rsto, rnd stop_ni ((fault_i or fault_ni) and SPA) and ActFI = notinject
asto, rsto, rnd asto_i (((fault_i or fault_ni) and SPA) or (asto_i or asto_ni))
and ActFI = inject
asto_ni (((fault_i or fault_ni) and SPA) or (asto_i or asto_ni))
and ActFI = notinject
asto, rsto, !rnd asto_i (fault_i or fault_ni) and SPA
rsto stop_ni ActFI = stop
Table 4
Deﬁnition of initial states of FI.
Options IFI
default {nofault}
rstt ∪ {w_rstt}
astt, !rstt ∪ {w_astt}
!rstt, !astt ∪ {fault_ni}
Table 5
Deﬁnitions of states for updating the evaluation function.
Options IND Options NIJ
default {fault_i} default {nofault, fault_ni}
asto, !rsto ∪ {stop_i} astt ∪ {w_astt}
asto, rsto ∪ {asto_i} rstt ∪ {w_rstt}
asto ∪ {stop_ni}
rsto ∪ {stop_ni}
PFI(fault_ni) = {inject}. As another example, for a fault injection agent with a random start and random stop we have 
that ActP = {inject, stop} therefore we have that PFI(fault_i) = {inject, stop}, PFI(fault_ni) = {notinject}, and PFI(w_rstt) =
{notinject, start}.
The transition relation for the fault injection agent is deﬁned in Table 3. In the table STA ⊆ Act1 × . . . × Actn × ActE is a 
set of start actions which stipulate when the fault can begin occurring SPA ⊆ Act1 × . . . × Actn × ActE is a set of stop actions 
which stipulate when the fault can stop occurring. Similar to the options of the fault injection agents these actions are 
assigned by the user. Note that the fault injection agent remains in the same state if none of the transition conditions are 
met.
The initial states of the fault injection agent are deﬁned in Table 4. The initial state is either nofault, which persists 
indeﬁnitely, or another state determined by the options. For example, if rstt is set, the initial state can be either nofault or 
w_rstt, i.e., no faults are ever injected by the fault injection agent or a random start must occur before faults are injected.
An example of a random fault injection agent with a random start and action stop is illustrated in Fig. 3. The states of 
the agent, initial states, transition between states, protocol, and actions are shown to clarify how the selected options can 
be used to stipulate the occurrence of a fault.
3.2.2. Transitions for the faulty agent
The mutation rules for the faulty agent that denote the mutated transition relation are shown in Table 6. In the table 
Trans indicates the evolution function, Target State indicates the target state of the chosen variable for the injected fault, 
and Transition Condition shows the transition condition of the evolution function under original and mutated conditions. 
In the target state column ∗ts indicates the original target state; similarly, in the transition condition column ∗tc indicates 
the original transition condition. When individual variable components of the target state and transition condition are 
distinguished, ∗ts and ∗tc indicate the remaining component of the target state and transition condition respectively. We 
write !(ACTFI = inject) to express that the fault is not injected at the current tick of the clock. We use vx to denote any value 
of a variable.
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• Boolean: Random fault indicates that a boolean variable var is updated with a value either T or F in tAF∗ for any value of 
var in tA .
• Boolean: Invert fault denotes that a boolean variable var is updated with the inverse of its current value vvar in tAF∗ for 
any value of var in tA .
• Boolean: Stuck At fault represents that a boolean variable var remains at its current value vvar in tAF∗ for any value of 
var in tA .
• Integer: Ramp Up fault encodes that the current value vvar of an integer variable var is incremented by a value n for any 
value of var in tA when vvar + n is less than or equal to the maximum possible value of var.
• Integer: Ramp Down fault signiﬁes that the current value vvar of an integer variable var is decremented by a value n for 
any value of var in tA when vvar − n is greater than zero.
• Integer: Stuck At fault expresses that an integer variable var remains at its current value vvar in tAF∗ for any value of var
in tA .
• Enumerate: Variable Value Replace fault denotes an enumerate variable var is updated with a value v2 in tAF∗ whenever 
the value of var is updated to v1 in tA .
• Enumerate: Variable Stuck At Select fault encodes that the value v1 of an enumerate variable var persists if the current 
value of var is v1 . If in tA the variable var is updated to a value vx = v1 when var = v1 , the faulty behaviour in tAF∗
preserves var = v1 .
• Enumerate, Boolean: Variable Transition fault represents that a variable var is set to the value v1 (v1 is T or F for a Boolean 
variable) in tAF∗ whenever the fault is injected regardless of the state the agent is in. Thus, the original behaviour is 
preserved for all transitions whenever !(ACTFI = inject), and only var is updated to v1 whenever ACTFI = inject.
3.2.3. The mutated model ISF∗
We can complete the description of the mutated model that has been deﬁned so far by introducing an appropriate 
set of atomic propositions to reason about faults. For each fault j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} the mutated set of atomic propositions 
APF∗ is extended by using the propositions faultyj, injectedj, injectingj, stoppedj . Initially if APF∗ = AP then in the default 
case we take APF∗ = APF∗ ∪ {faultyj} where faultyj is deﬁned to reason about whether faults are ever injected in a given 
run. The corresponding evaluation function V is updated so that V F∗(faulty j) = {g ∈ G | lAF∗ (g) = nofault j}. Similarly we 
have APF∗ = APF∗ ∪ {injectedj}. The corresponding evaluation function is updated according to INDj ⊂ LFI , a set of local states 
of FIj in which faults are injected at the current tick of the clock as deﬁned in Table 5, so that V F∗(injected j) = {g ∈
G | lAF∗ (g) ∈ IND j}. For random faults if any start or stop option is selected then APF∗ = APF∗ ∪ {injectingj} and the cor-
responding evaluation function is updated according to NIJj ⊂ LFIj a set of local states of FIj in which faults cannot be 
injected at the current tick of the clock as deﬁned in Table 5, so that V F∗(injecting j) = {g ∈ G | lAF∗ (g) /∈ NIJ j}. If any 
stop option is selected we have that APF∗ = APF∗ ∪ {stoppedj} and the corresponding evaluation function is updated so that 
V F∗(stopped j) = {g ∈ G | lAF∗ (g) = stop_ni j}. The extended faulty system is thus formally deﬁned as follows:
ISF∗ = 〈(LF∗i,ActF∗i,PF∗i, tF∗i)i∈{1,...,n+m}, LE,ActE,PE, tE), IF∗,VF∗〉.
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Mutation rules for AF∗ .
Boolean: Random, var is set randomly to F or T
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = F or T and ∗ts ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Boolean: Invert, var is inverted
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var =!vvar and ∗ts ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Boolean: Stuck At, var remains at its current value
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = vvar and ∗ts ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Integer: Ramp Up, the value of var is incremented by n
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = vvar + n and ∗ts ∗tc and vvar + n<= max(var) and ACTFI = inject
Integer: Ramp Down, the value of var is decremented by n
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = vvar − n and ∗ts ∗tc and vvar − n> 0 and ACTFI = inject
Integer: Stuck At, var remains at its current value
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = vvar and ∗ts ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Enumerate: Variable Value Replace, when var is v1 it is set to v2
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = v1 and ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ var = v1 and ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = v2 and ∗ts ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Enumerate: Stuck At Select, when var is v1 it remains at v1
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA var = vx and ∗ts var = v1 and ∗tc
tAF∗ var = vx and ∗ts var = v1 and ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = v1 and ∗ts var = v1 and ∗tc and ACTFI = inject
Enumerate, Boolean: Variable Transition, var is set to v1 (v1 is either F or T for Boolean)
Trans Target state Transition condition
tA ∗ts ∗tc
tAF∗ ∗ts ∗tc and !(ACTFI = inject)
tAF∗ var = v1 ACTFI = inject
4. Reasoning about correct and faulty behaviour
Our starting point is some of the existing approaches for the veriﬁcation of MAS against temporal-epistemic speciﬁca-
tions [19]. This analysis normally assumes the model represents all the (correct) executions of the system. We can now 
use the mutated model ISF∗ , generated as described in the previous section, to reason about both the correct and faulty
behaviours of the system. This allows us to examine, for instance, whether some temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations that 
were valid on the original model remain true should a fault occur in the system. We go a step further and establish speci-
ﬁcation patterns enabling us to identify classes of behaviour of interest. We are particularly concerned with fault tolerance, 
recoverability, and diagnosability. We analyse these below.
Given a set of m faults introduced into the mutated model and any fault j ∈ {1 . . .m} in this set, we deﬁne a class of 
formulas Θj to reason about the intermittent persistence of a single fault j as follows:
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Θj ::= injectingj|stoppedj|injectedj|¬Θj|Θj ∨ Θj|Θj ∧ Θj
To reason about multiple faults we deﬁne classes of formulas for the intermittent persistence of multiple faults Ψ and the 
overall persistence of multiple faults Φ by means of the following syntax:
Ψ ::= Θj∈{1,...,m}|¬Ψ |Ψ ∨ Ψ |Ψ ∧ Ψ
Φ ::= faultyj∈{1,...,m}|¬Φ|Φ ∨ Φ|Φ ∧ Φ
The BNF grammars above deﬁne Boolean formulas representing properties of interest in the respective class. Observe 
that properties concerning multiple faults are expressed as Boolean combinations of formulas encoding single faults.
4.1. Reasoning about total tolerance to injected faults
We wish to deﬁne speciﬁcation patterns that enable us to reason about the fault tolerance of a system with respect to any 
speciﬁcation encoded as a logical formula ϕ in CTLK. We begin by considering the simple formula:
AGϕ (4.1)
In ISF∗ this formula holds if ϕ is unaffected by the faulty behaviour. We can say that if the formula holds, then the system 
demonstrates total tolerance to the faults.
In general a system is likely to tolerate some faults but not others; to isolate the consequences of speciﬁc faults we 
therefore need to restrict our analysis. The following speciﬁcation can be used to verify whether ϕ always holds even in the 
presence of speciﬁc faults:
AG(Φ → ϕ) (4.2)
Given that formulas in Φ are path-invariant (see the deﬁnition of faulty in Section 3.2.1), this formula states that ϕ holds 
along a set of computational paths denoted by the overall persistence of multiple faults Φ . Effectively, the role of Φ is to 
restrict our analysis to the computational paths of interest, e.g., those that exhibit the absence of a fault or the presence any
faulty behaviour introduced by the faults in question. This allows us to reason about the total tolerance of ϕ with respect to 
a speciﬁc fault or any combinations of faults, i.e., the fact that the speciﬁcation ϕ holds in the system even when the fault 
in question is present.
4.1.1. Example speciﬁcations of total tolerance
We now introduce some models in Fig. 4 to illustrate how Formulas (4.1) and (4.2) can be used to deﬁne speciﬁcations of 
total tolerance. The example highlights some of the computational paths from the top of the circle to the bottom of the circle 
that we may wish to analyse in the entire reachable state space of the system (contained within the black circle), when two 
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in paths where their respective fault is enabled and false otherwise. The coloured areas represent portions of the state-space 
where not only faults are enabled (faulty), but they also injected at the current tick (injected).
The variations include paths along which no faults are injected, paths along which faults are injected and combinations 
of both. Under each model we report instances of Formula (4.1) or (4.2) that hold on the particular model.
We can use Formula (4.2) to reason about only the correct behaviour of the system, speciﬁc faults, combinations of faults 
as follows:
AG((¬faulty1 ∧ ¬faulty2) → ϕ)
AG(faulty1 → ϕ)
AG((faulty1 ∨ faulty2) → ϕ)
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation states that ϕ always holds when neither fault is ever injected. The second speciﬁcation stipulates that 
ϕ always holds whenever fault 1 can be injected. The third speciﬁcation states that ϕ always holds whenever either fault 1 
or fault 2 can be injected.
4.2. Reasoning about tolerance to injected intermittent faults
Reasoning about the total tolerance to system faults can be useful for systems in which a property must hold in all faulty 
scenarios. However, it is often useful to reason about the tolerance to faults when these occur intermittently.
The following formula can be used to verify that ϕ always holds at points in which an intermittent fault is injected:
AG(Ψ → ϕ) (4.3)
This formula states that ϕ holds in all reachable computational paths in which the intermittent persistence of multiple 
faults Ψ holds. This enables us to assess the tolerance of the system with respect to ϕ and the combination of intermittent 
faults in question.
We can further combine Formulas (4.2) and (4.3) to reason about intermittent faulty behaviour when speciﬁc faults are 
either absent or present in the system by means of the formula:
AG(Φ ∧ Ψ → ϕ) (4.4)
4.2.1. Example speciﬁcations of tolerance to intermittent faults
Analogously to Fig. 4, Fig. 5 shows some models illustrating a few variations (amongst many) of how Formulas (4.3) and 
(4.4) can be used to deﬁne speciﬁcations of tolerance to intermittent faults which can be read in the same way as Fig. 4. 
Here we also introduce start and stop points indicating the point at which a fault begins and ends injecting in relation to 
the transitions from the set of states {w_rstt, w_astt} and the transition into the set of states {stop_i, stop_ni} of the fault 
injection agent.
Speciﬁcations based on Formula (4.3) can be used to reason about the behaviour of the system whenever a fault is 
injected, whenever a fault cannot be injected, and after a fault has stopped being injected as follows:
AG(injected1 → ϕ)
AG(¬injecting1 → ϕ)
AG(stopped1 → ϕ)
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation determines whether ϕ is tolerant to fault 1 during its occurrence at the current tick. The second 
speciﬁcation stipulates that ϕ holds whenever fault 1 does not occur at the current tick. The third speciﬁcation states that 
ϕ always holds when fault 1 has previously been injected but cannot be injected again (at the current tick and in all future 
ticks).
We can utilise speciﬁcations based on Formula (4.4) to reason about the intermittent persistence of a fault when another 
fault is absent. For example, the formula
AG(¬faulty2 ∧ stopped1 → ϕ)
states that ϕ always holds whenever fault 2 cannot be injected and fault 1 has previously been injected but cannot be 
injected again. Formula (4.4) can therefore be used to determine whether the system is tolerant to a fault whenever another 
fault is not present.
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Fig. 6. Example models highlighting speciﬁcations of recoverability.
4.3. Reasoning about recoverability
The following formula can be used to reason about the recoverability of the system when a fault occurs.
AG(injected j → EFϕ); (4.5)
This formula captures the fact it is always true that whenever a fault is injected, along some path at some point ϕ holds. 
Thus, if this speciﬁcation holds, it can be determined that the system might recover from the fault in terms of property ϕ .
We may wish to establish whether the system enjoys stronger robustness by analysing the property:
AG(injected j → AFϕ); (4.6)
This formula states that is always true that whenever a fault is injected, along all paths at some point ϕ holds. Thus, if 
this speciﬁcation holds, the system will eventually recover from the fault in terms of property ϕ .
The models in Fig. 6 highlight recoverability speciﬁcations which are based on Formulas (4.5) and (4.6) which can be 
read in the same way as those in Fig. 5.
Formulas (4.2), (4.5), and (4.6) can be combined to reason about recoverability as follows:
AG(Φ ∧ injected j → EFϕ); (4.7)
AG(Φ ∧ injected j → AFϕ); (4.8)
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system when reasoning about recoverability from an injected fault.
Note that by using the formulas above we cannot gain any insight in terms of how long it takes for the system to recover, 
nor how probable the recovery is (in the case of Formula (4.5)). These limitations are inherent in the use of CTL. They can 
be overcome by employing more expressive logics; we do not pursue this here.
4.4. Reasoning about diagnosability
Having so far explored the issue of resilience to faults with respect to temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations, we now turn our 
attention to diagnosability [14]. We express diagnosability, i.e., the ability of a system to identify a malfunctioning compo-
nent, by means of epistemic speciﬁcations. We distinguish between diagnosability properties in the presence of observable 
and unobservable system behaviour. Observability will be used to ascertain whether the system’s diagnosability mechanism 
functions correctly. Assumptions on unobservable behaviour will be used to refer to the traditional diagnosability setting of 
post-mortem analysis, i.e., when we wish to reason about faults after they have occurred.
We write 	 to indicate a diagnosis property of the system in which the diagnosis of an individual fault or group of faults 
from the observable behaviour of the system is ascertained. Consider the following formula:
AG(	 → Ki(faulty j)) (4.9)
This formula states that whenever a diagnosis property of the system 	 occurs, agent i knows that fault j may be present 
(i.e., it has been injected). The distinction between paths of faulty behaviour by the diagnosis property provides an insight 
into the ability of agent i to determine that the faulty behaviour has occurred. This speciﬁcation is useful for verifying 
diagnosability in agents that distinguish and act upon individual faults, e.g., those whose task is to restore functionality to 
the system.
In the case where a diagnosis is made for different types of faults using the same mechanism, given any fault k ∈ {1 . . .m}
consider the following formula:
AG((faulty j ∧ faultyk ∧ 	) → (Ki(Θ j ∨ Θk) ∧ ¬Ki(Θ j) ∧ ¬Ki(Θk))) (4.10)
This formula states that whenever faults j and k can be injected and a diagnosis property of the system 	 occurs, agent i
knows that either Θj or Θk (e.g., a fault j or k is being injected at the current tick of the clock, can be injected at the current 
tick of the clock, or has stopped being injected) but does not know speciﬁcally whether it is Θj or Θk . Thus, the formula 
speciﬁes the ability of agent i to use the same mechanism for identifying a range of faults correctly, rather than diagnosing 
individual faults. Note that, in contrast to Formulas (4.10), (4.9) the formula speciﬁes a “minimal” form of diagnosis for the 
disjunction of the fault. By insisting on the two ﬁnal conjuncts we ensure that no incorrect diagnosis of any underlying 
individual fault is made by agent i. For instance, if we had Ki(Θ j) every time f aulty j ∧ f aultyk holds, then Ki(Θ j ∨ Θk)
would hold but this may at times correspond to an incorrect diagnosis. The speciﬁcation above forces the diagnosis only to 
refer to the disjunction of faults, but insists on no incorrect diagnosis ever being made.
We now consider knowledge of faults in relation to the occurrence of faults. Here, we only consider speciﬁcations per-
taining to the diagnosis of faults after they have ﬁrst occurred. Speciﬁcations that consider the diagnosis of re-occurring 
faults can be further deﬁned.
The following formula can be used to reason about diagnosability when a fault has occurred without explicitly referenc-
ing a diagnosis property of the system.
¬E(¬Θ j U (Θ j ∧ ¬AF(Ki(Θ j)))) (4.11)
This formula states that there is no path in which at some point Θj becomes true and at which point it is not true that 
at some point in the future agent i knows Θj . The formula speciﬁes the ability of agent i to diagnose faults correctly in 
relation to the occurrence of faults, such as when a fault begins occurring. The speciﬁcation makes no reference to how it 
takes for this knowledge to become acquired; but this can be added by suitable encoding of propositional facts.
So far we have described speciﬁcations pertaining to individual agent diagnosis of faults. It is also possible to reason 
about group knowledge of faults. Consider the following speciﬁcation:
¬E(¬Θ j U (Θ j ∧ ¬AF(DΓ (Θ j))) (4.12)
This formula states that there is no path in which at some point Θj and at which point it is not true that at some point in 
the future it is distributed knowledge amongst the group Γ that Θj . The formula speciﬁes the ability of a group of agents 
to diagnose faults correctly. It is important to assess when the group as a whole have suﬃcient information to know a fact, 
in this case a correct diagnosis. This means that there is suﬃcient information in the system for this fact to become known 
and the engineer can, in principle, devise an information sharing protocol for this fact to become explicitly known by some 
or all agents in the system. For more details and a discussion of further aspects of distributed knowledge we refer to [2]. 
When there is a need, similar speciﬁcations can obviously also be given determining whether a speciﬁc, some, or every 
agent in a group knows about the fault, or indeed whether a group acquires common knowledge of the fault.
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Finally, we may wish to reason about the propagation of the knowledge of faults through the system, using the following 
speciﬁcation:
¬E(¬Ki(Θ j) U (Ki(Θ j) ∧ ¬AF(EΓ (Θ j)))) (4.13)
This formula states that there is no path in which at some point agent i comes to know Θj and at which point it is not true 
that at some point in the future everybody in group Γ knows Θj . This formula speciﬁes the propagation of the knowledge 
of faults to a group of agents. In other words if at some point agent i comes to know Θj , then eventually all agents in Γ will 
know this. Similar speciﬁcations can also be deﬁned determining whether distributed knowledge of a fault amongst a group 
of agents results in knowledge of that fault for an individual agent, i.e., agents exchanging information so that someone 
knows about the fault, and whether everybody knowing about the fault leads to common knowledge of the fault.
The diagnosability formulas can be extended where required, for example we can extend Formulas (4.11), (4.12), and 
(4.13), to reason about the diagnosis of a range of faults in a similar manner to Formula (4.10).
We stress that the analysis above is only concerned with devising speciﬁcations to assess whether the system possesses 
some elements of resilience and diagnosability. The actual mechanisms that realise these properties are coded at system 
level and are not of concern here.
5. A toolkit for fault injection
To reason about a MAS diagnosability properties, we have built a prototype toolkit that operates on appropriate MAS 
models. The toolkit supports the injection of faults into ISPL programs in a variety of ways described below. The mutated 
models can then be checked by MCMAS [19], a model checker that takes ISPL ﬁles as input. The toolkit, written in C++ using 
GTK+ for the GUI, is targeted for Linux operating systems, and is available for public use [28].
Toolkit architecture The toolkit takes an ISPL program as input and provides a GUI which allows the user to inject faults 
into the MAS model and output a mutated MAS model. The architecture of the toolkit is shown in Fig. 7. The process for 
injecting faults is as follows:
1. The GUI invokes the Parser to read in the agent deﬁnitions from the ISPL input program describing the original model.
2. The agents deﬁnitions are used as input into the GUI to allow the user to deﬁne faults.
3. The faults deﬁnitions are created by the user using the GUI.
4. Once the user has ﬁnished deﬁning faults, the GUI invokes the Injector.
5. The Injector combines the agents and faults deﬁnitions to create an ISPL output program deﬁning the mutated model, 
containing both correct and faulty executions, ready to be checked by MCMAS.
Parser The Parser is given a ﬁlename for the ISPL input program. First, the Parser checks the input program to ensure it 
is correctly deﬁned. Any programs that are incorrectly deﬁned are rejected. The Parser then creates an object in memory 
containing the agent deﬁnitions. This includes the name of the agents, the variables deﬁned in each agent, their actions, 
protocols, and transition relations. The object also contains information pertaining to the initial states, global variables, 
groups, fairness deﬁnitions, and speciﬁcations deﬁned in the ISPL input program.
GUI The GUI facilitates the injection of any number of faults using any number of corresponding fault injection agents. 
Each fault injection agent is named uniquely and can be deﬁned using several persistence options. The GUI is illustrated in 
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For each line L in tA
If Find(LHS(L), var + "=" + v1)
tA* += LHS(L) + "if" + RHS(L) + "and"
+ FI + ".Action = inject"\n";
tA* += Remove(LHS(L), var + "=" + v1)
+ "if" + RHS(L) + "and !"
+ FI + "Action = inject\n";
else
tA* += LHS(L) + "if" + RHS(L) + "\n";
Fig. 9. The Injector mutation function pseudo-code.
Fig. 7, which shows the way in which the agents, variables, and types of faults can be selected, and the manner in which 
persistence options can be deﬁned for the fault.
After a correctly deﬁned ISPL program is given via the GUI, the user can add faults for injection by ﬁrstly selecting the 
agent and variable she wishes to inject the fault on, followed by the type of fault they wish to create (Fig. 8). Each option 
is presented to the user using a drop down list of available agents, variables, and fault types. After these options have been 
selected the Add Fault button is used to introduce the fault. The user is then asked to name the fault and choose options 
relating to the faults persistence using drop down lists.
Once the user has added the faults, he or she can choose to click on the Inject button, which allows the user to specify 
an output ﬁle for the mutated ISPL program. The Injector is then invoked by the GUI thereby creating the ISPL output ﬁle. 
The ISPL ﬁle is then used as input with MCMAS.
Injector The Injector combines the agents and faults deﬁnitions to create an ISPL output program containing correct and 
faulty behaviour. The ﬁrst task of the Injector is to output the fault injection agents. For each fault the ISPL code is created 
for the associated fault injection agent according to the name of the fault and the persistence options.
The next task is to output all of the non-fault injection agents evolution functions including both correct and faulty 
behaviour according to the faults deﬁnitions. The ISPL code is mutated by applying the mutation rules of a fault to each 
evolution line of the agent the fault is being injected into. The transition relation is mutated into the transition relation of 
the faulty agent tAF∗ . The mutation is performed using string ﬁnd and string remove functions. The pseudo-code in Fig. 9
illustrates how the transition relation tA of an agent A is mutated for a stuck-at-select fault where the variable stuck at 
is v1. In the pseudo-code LHS returns a string containing the target state and RHS returns a string containing the transition 
condition. The function Find returns a boolean value indicating whether a string has been found. The function Remove takes 
two strings as parameters, removes the second string from the ﬁrst string and returns the resulting string.
To inject multiple faults on the same agent, the process is repeated for each fault on the transition relation mutated by 
the previous fault.
Finally, the Injector outputs the mutated initial states and global states according to the faults deﬁnitions, as well as the 
groups, fairness, and speciﬁcations from the original model.
6. Evaluation
In the previous sections we have introduced a taxonomy of speciﬁcations for reasoning about faults, recovery, and diag-
nosability in the context of temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations for MAS. This has formed the backbone of a methodology for 
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model mutation that allows to take any MAS model programmed in ISPL and inject faults automatically into it through a 
toolkit thereby obtaining an updated model representing the faulty behaviour under analysis. This software toolkit, released 
as open-source to the community, can be used in collaboration with engineers to analyse fault-tolerance, recovery, and 
effective diagnosability with respect to MAS-based speciﬁcations in concrete engineering scenarios.
We assume begin studying a system through its discrete model given in ISPL. Note that automatic discretisation and 
abstraction techniques as well as compilers from a number of languages into ISPL have been developed; see, e.g., [26]. From 
the ISPL model we can model check the speciﬁcations of interest and verify whether they hold. If the system is found 
not to meet its speciﬁcations, the usual process of reﬁnement (facilitated by MCMAS’s production of counterexamples) can 
be carried out. The case of interest here is when the speciﬁc system meets its speciﬁcation, but there is an interest in 
analysing the consequences of possible faults in the system. Indeed, in many concrete engineering cases, there are very 
concrete indications from case studies and prototypes on what parts of the system may develop faults and how these faults 
could manifest themselves. A large number of them correspond to the failure modes we discussed earlier in Section 3.
In other words, the methodology and toolkit presented allow the engineer to inject automatically faults of interest in a 
given model, generate the resulting system, and analyse key speciﬁcations on the mutated system. Below we illustrate this 
process in the case of a popular networking protocol, the IEEE 802.5 Token Ring protocol [29]. Through this analysis we 
will observe that the protocol does satisfy some key speciﬁcations whenever no host develops a fault, but we will focus 
on the impact the faults have in terms of recoverability and diagnosability properties. To do so we will analyse a speciﬁc 
network running the protocol and mutate the behaviour of some hosts to model speciﬁc kinds of failure. By means of the 
methodology described so far we will then analyse the resulting properties of the instantiated example. While our analysis 
generally conﬁrms the robustness of the IEEE 802.5 in the case analysed, this section is not intended to provide a validation 
of the IEEE 802.5. Doing so would require to analyse an arbitrary number of hosts and arbitrary faults, therefore requiring, 
among others, topological considerations and parametric analysis (see, e.g., [30]). Instead, the aim here is simply to illustrate 
the methodology on a concrete case study drawn from applications. We conducted an analogous exercise in the context of 
fault-tolerance and diagnosis of autonomous vehicles in [31]. We opt for the IEEE protocol here because of its broader 
interest.
6.1. Overview of the protocol
The IEEE 802.5 token ring protocol is a popular local area network (LAN) protocol in which the nodes of the network 
are logically organised in a ring topology. The data circulates in one direction in the form of a token passed from node to 
node. While the token ring is logically deﬁned as a ring topology, it is physically deﬁned as a star topology as illustrated in 
Fig. 10. This facilitates fault tolerance by allowing faulty nodes to be bypassed by physically disconnecting the faulty node 
and re-establishing the logical ring.
To ensure fault tolerance a node can act as a monitor to diagnose faults and take action to resolve them. During the 
normal operation of the network a token can be populated by a node with data to be sent to another node. When a fault 
occurs, tokens containing fault information are sent around the network thereby allowing a monitor to identify and correct 
faults on the network.
When the ring is initialised, a contention process takes place during which one node is designated as an active monitor. 
The active monitor has the responsibility of issuing new tokens when tokens are lost, removing orphaned tokens which 
circulate the ring more than once, and establishing and re-establishing a fully operational ring. The rest of the nodes act 
as standby monitors and are responsible for diagnosing faulty nodes or cable breaks. When an active monitor is unable to 
perform its duties correctly, a standby monitor can make a claim to become an active monitor.
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nodes is made possible by using several different types of tokens. A data token circulates the ring when the ring is fully 
operational. A claim token is used to decide which node becomes the active monitor. When a node receives the claim token 
back, it becomes the active monitor. A ringpolling token is used by the active monitor to establish the correct operation 
of the ring. When the active monitor receives the ringpolling token back, it creates a new data token and circulates it. 
A beaconing token is used to signal a problem when a node is unable to receive tokens. It contains the address of the last 
known nearest upstream neighbour of the node that is not receiving tokens.
Determining whether there is a problem on the network is achieved by a timer on each node. After it has sent out a 
data token, the active monitor starts a timer that counts down until the time it takes for a token to circulate the network. 
If the timer reaches zero without the active monitor receiving the token back, the active monitor knows the data token 
has been lost and sends out a ringpolling token. If a timeout occurs for the ringpolling token, the active monitor knows it 
cannot establish a fully operational ring, de-activates itself as active monitor and initiates the claim token process. All other 
nodes timeout when they have not received a token from their nearest upstream neighbour after a speciﬁed period of time. 
If this timeout occurs, the node makes a claim to become the active monitor. If the claim process times out, the node goes 
into beaconing mode.
The goal of the beaconing process is to allow the ring to bypass any faulty nodes on the network. The beaconing node 
identiﬁes the fault domain as either itself or its nearest upstream neighbour by sending out a beaconing token containing 
the address of its nearest upstream neighbour. If a node receives several beaconing tokens reporting it as the faulty node, 
it disconnects from the network. If a beaconing station sends out several beaconing tokens with no success in repairing the 
network it disconnects from the network.
The protocol deﬁnes that the active monitor must send regular messages around the ring to let standby monitors know 
it is present on the ring. If a standby monitor has not received an active monitor message for a speciﬁed period of time, it 
enters into the claim process. This ensures fault tolerance in situations where the active monitor becomes faulty and cannot 
monitor the network for faults.
6.2. ISPL implementation
We encoded the token ring protocol above described as an ISPL program. In the ISPL implementation the environment 
agent encodes the hub, abstracts from the timer details of the individual nodes, and manages the token being passed among 
nodes. A node agent represents a node of the network; we implement as many node agents as there are nodes on the ring. 
Each node agent is named N[x] where [x] is the number of the node. One node on the ring is designated as a sender 
and one node is designated as a receiver. The sender sends messages to the receiver until it receives an acknowledgement. 
A token agent contains the token data; an associated token bit agent determines whether the token has been inspected. 
Active monitor messages were omitted from the implementation to investigate situations in which there is no information 
passed between nodes indicating that the active monitor has become faulty.
We deﬁned a network with 6 nodes: N1, . . . ,N6. The nodes are arranged clockwise from Node 1 to Node 6 with the token 
circulating clockwise; it is assumed Node 1 always wins contention for the active monitor. We declare Node 2 as a sender 
and Node 6 as a receiver. Node 2 repeatedly sends messages to Node 6 until Node 2 has received an acknowledgement from 
Node 6. The implementation is available for download [28].
6.2.1. Environment agent
The environment agent implements the physical ring hub and abstracts from the timer details of the individual nodes 
and manages the token passing between nodes. The variables are deﬁned as follows.
Status {Wait_tok,Wait_ack, Send,TO_tok,TO_ack}
Token {D,C,RP,B}
SStatus {Processing, Sending}
Timeout 0 . . . TIMEOUT_VAL
Curnode 1 . . .NUM_NODES
Amonitor 0 . . .NUM_NODES
where Status is the current status of the hub, Token is the token received and sent by the hub, SStatus indicates whether a 
message or token is being processed or sent, Timeout is a timeout counter, Curnode indicates the last node the token was 
sent to and Amonitor is the current active monitor.
The hub waits for tokens (Wait_tok) to be sent to it. In each evolution if a token has not been received by the hub, 
the Timeout timer counts down. If a token is received from a node, it sends the token (Send) to the nearest downstream 
neighbour, bypassing nodes that have been disconnected. The Timeout timer is then reset and the hub waits for an acknowl-
edgement that the token has been received from the node that the token was sent to (Wait_ack). If an acknowledgement is 
received, it waits for the next token to be sent (Wait_tok); otherwise the timeout timer counts down.
If the timeout counter reaches zero, a timeout message is sent. If the timeout occurs waiting for a token from a node 
(TO_tok), a timeout message is sent to the active monitor; if there is no active monitor, the timeout message is sent to 
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(TO_ack), a timeout message is sent to the active monitor; if there is no active monitor, the timeout message is sent to the 
node. Thus, the timeouts occur in the correct sequence: ﬁrst, the active monitor times out; then the nearest downstream 
neighbour of the node that is not sending tokens times out. Similarly, if a node is not receiving tokens, the active monitor 
times out, followed by the node.
Tokens are sent to nodes via an action Send_[n]_[t], where n is the value of the variable Curnode and t is the value of 
the variable Token. Similarly, the timeout message action is Timeout_[n], where n is the value of Amonitor or Curnode.
6.2.2. Node agent
The node agent is comprised of a number of enumerate, integer and boolean variables as follows:
Istatus {Wait,Process,TimeO, SetT, Send,Disconnect}
Rstatus {Repeating,Ringpolling,Claiming,Beaconing}
Token {D,RP,C,B}
Amonitor boolean
Bfailed 1 . . .NUM_FAILED
Breceived 1 . . .NUM_RECEIVED
Rec boolean
Sent boolean
where Istatus is the internal status of the agent; Rstatus is the status on the ring; Token is the current token being processed 
or sent by the agent; Amonitor deﬁnes whether the node is an active monitor; Bfailed indicates the number of beaconing 
tokens that have been sent unsuccessfully; Breceived indicates the number of beaconing tokens that have been received; 
Sent is only applicable to the sender nodes and indicates that it has sent a message to a receiver; similarly, Rec indicates 
whether a receiver has received a message or a sender has received an acknowledgement.
In terms of behaviours, a node agent starts off by waiting for a token (Wait). When a token is received, it processes 
the token (Process). After this, it can set the token (SetT) before sending the token (Send) at which point it returns to 
waiting. When a token has not been received after a speciﬁed period of time, the node receives a message from the envi-
ronment stating that the timer has timed out (TimeO). If the node receives or sends several beaconing tokens, it disconnects 
(Disconnect), and remains in this state. Tokens are sent using an action Send_[t], where [t] is the type of token.
A node can populate the token using the Set_token_D action. If the node is an active monitor it can free the token 
using the Free_token action or set a ﬂag to indicate the token has been seen using the Set_Token_bit action. A receiver that 
receives a token destined for it sets Rec to true and populates the token with an acknowledgement. If the sender receives 
an acknowledgement, it sets Rec to true and stops sending messages to the receiver.
6.2.3. Token agents
The Token_data agent contains a single integer variable Node_number which represents the data of the token (i.e., a des-
tination for the token) and is set according the actions of node agents. If the sender node agent performs a Set_token_D
action, the value is set to the number of the receiver node. If the receiver node agent performs a Set_token_D action, the 
value is set to the number of the sender node. If a node agent performs a Set_token_C action, the token is set to the number 
of the node performing the action. If a node agent performs a Set_token_B action, the token is set to the number of the 
nodes nearest upstream neighbour. If a node agent performs a Free_token action, Node_number is set to zero. The action 
associated with Node_number is the value of Node_number (i.e., action One for value 1, action Two for value 2 etc.), which 
allows a node agent to determine whether the token is destined for it.
The Token_bit agent contains a single boolean variable Bit which is set to true whenever a node agent performs a 
Set_Token_bit action and false if a Free_token action is performed. The associated actions with Bit are Set and Not_set accord-
ing to whether it is set to true or false respectively.
6.3. Choice of injected faults
Having implemented the protocol in ISPL we checked with MCMAS whether the network we modelled satisﬁed some 
key speciﬁcations. For example, among others, we checked that the formulas below are true on the model:
AF(msgsent)
AG(msgsent → (AF(recack)))
AG(¬am → (AF(am)))
AG(¬beaconing)
AG(¬timeout)
This provided reassurance that the model is sound.
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Injected faults on the token ring protocol.
Fault Agent Fault type Persistence
TKwd Token_data Variable transition (Node_number) rstt, astt, asto
v1= 7 STA = {N2.Send_D}
SPA = {TKwd.injected}
N1sm N1 Boolean Set (Amonitor) rstt, astt, asto
v1= false STA = {N1.Send_D}
SPA = {N1sm.injected}
sN2ns N2 State replace (Istatus) rstt, astt, asto
v1= Sending STA = {N1.Send_D}
v2= Waiting SPA = {N1.Send_C}
hN3ns N3 State replace (Istatus) rstt, astt, asto
v1= Sending STA = {N2.Send_D ,
v2 = Waiting !N3.Disconnected}
SPA = {N3.Disconnected}
hN4nr N4 Stuck at select (Istatus) rstt, astt, asto
v1= Waiting STA = {N3.Send_D}
SPA = {N4.Disconnected}
hN6ns N6 State replace (Istatus) rstt, astt, asto
v1= Sending STA = {N5.Send_D}
v2= Waiting SPA = {N6.Disconnected}
To evaluate the methodology we injected a number of soft and hard faults into the model to evaluate the protocol’s 
response. These are shown in Table 7 where Fault indicates the name chosen for the fault, Agent is the node that the 
fault is injected on, Fault Type is the type of fault injected and the corresponding parameters, and Persistence indicates the 
persistence options for the fault. The meaning of the faults is as follows:
TKwd: A populated data token becomes destined for the wrong workstation.
N1sm: Node 1 becomes a standby monitor if it is an active monitor.
sN2ns: Node 2 stops sending tokens (soft fault).
hN3ns: Node 3 stops sending tokens (hard fault).
hN4nr: Node 4 stops receiving tokens (hard fault).
hN6ns: Node 6 stops sending tokens (hard fault).
Our use of soft and hard faults is derived from a standard classiﬁcation of fault types for token ring networks [32]. A soft
fault is an intermittent error cause by (amongst other things) degradation of the electrical signal. The ring can recover 
from a soft fault such as a packet loss without entering the beaconing process. A hard fault is a persistent error caused by 
disruption of the electrical signal path at some point on the ring. This prevents tokens from circulating until the faulty node 
is removed. While the primary aim of this exercise is to provide an illustration of the methodology, the combination chosen 
is rich and relatively realistic in terms of faults that may actually happen on a network. Further faults could be added, but 
it would be unreasonable to expect that properties of fault-tolerance from the protocol could be reasoned about when, for 
example, a hard fault occurs on all of the nodes, since this would result in a total network failure.
In order to keep a suﬃcient number of nodes on the ring so that message delivery and acknowledgement can take place 
following the occurrence of hard faults, we stipulated that the ring does not enter a state where non-faulty nodes become 
disconnected. To achieve this, the start actions for the hard and soft faults are set so that the faults occur at different 
times, and only when the ring is sending data tokens. Furthermore, since Node 3 can become disconnected by a hard 
fault on Node 4, hN3ns can only begin occurring when Node 3 is not disconnected. To distinguish between soft and hard 
faults, the stop action for the soft fault sN2ns is set so that it stops occurring when there is no active monitor on the ring. 
The stop actions for the hard faults imply that a hard fault stops occurring once the node causing a problem has become 
disconnected.
Both the TKwd and N1sm faults stop occurring immediately after they ﬁrst occur, which is suﬃcient to create the desired 
failures. The token destination can become incorrect when the sender (Node 2) sends a data token. Node 1 can become a 
standby monitor whenever it has sent a data token, at which point it is assumed to be an active monitor. These faults allow 
us to investigate faulty scenarios in which there is an orphaned token on the ring and faulty scenarios in which there is no 
active monitor on the ring.
Fairness is imposed on the faults so that in any path where faulty is true for a fault, eventually a random start is invoked 
for the fault.
6.4. Code mutation
We now illustrate automatic ISPL code mutation as performed by the fault injection toolkit on the hN4nr fault. The 
corresponding fault injection agent is deﬁned in ISPL as follows:
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Vars:
status: {not_fault,w_astt,fault_i,stop_i, w_rstt};
end Vars
Actions = {dont_inject,inject,start};
Protocol:
status = stop_i : {dont_inject};
status = fault_i : {inject};
status = w_astt : {dont_inject};
status = w_rstt : {dont_inject,start};
status = not_fault : {dont_inject};
end Protocol
Evolution:
status = stop_i if status = fault_i and Node_4.Action = disconnected;
status = fault_i if status = w_astt and Node_2.Action = send_N;
status = w_astt if hN4nr.Action = start;
end Evolution
end Agent
The corresponding evolution function in the Node 4 agent is updated to contain a stuck-at-select fault where v1 is waiting. 
The ISPL code is deﬁned as follows with the boxed code containing the update to the original evolution function:
Evolution:
Istatus = Process and Token = D if Istatus = Wait and
Environment.Action = send_node_4_D
and !hN4nr.Action = inject ;
Istatus = Process and Token = C if Istatus = Wait and
Environment.Action = send_node_4_C
and !hN4nr.Action = inject ;
Istatus = Process and Token = RP if Istatus = Wait and
Environment.Action = send_node_4_RP
and !hN4nr.Action = inject ;
Istatus = Process and Token = B if Istatus = Wait and
Environment.Action = send_node_4_B
and !hN4nr.Action = inject ;
Token = D if Istatus = Wait
and Environment.Action = send_node_4_D
and hN4nr.Action = inject;
Token = C if Istatus = Wait
and Environment.Action = send_node_4_C
and hN4nr.Action = inject;
Token = RP if Istatus = Wait
and Environment.Action = send_node_4_RP
and hN4nr.Action = inject;
Token = B if Istatus = Wait
and Environment.Action = send_node_4_B
and hN4nr.Action = inject;
.
.
end Evolution
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Boolean formulas used in the evaluation of the token ring protocol.
Proposition Condition
msgsent N2.Sent = true
recack N2.Rec = true
timeout N1.Istatus = TimeO∨ N2.Istatus = TimeO
∨, . . . ,∨ N6.Istatus = TimeO
timeoutnoam N2.Istatus = TimeO∨ N3.Istatus = TimeO
∨, . . . ,∨ N6.Istatus = TimeO
beaconing N1.RStatus = Beaconing ∨ N2.RStatus = Beaconing
∨, . . . ,∨ N6.RStatus = Beaconing
token_free Token_data.Node_Number = 0
am N1.Amonitor = true∨ N2.Amonitor = true∨ . . .
∨ N5.Amonitor = true∨ N6.Amonitor = false
N3d N3.Istatus = Disconnect
N4sb N3.RStatus = Beaconing ∧ N3.Bfailed = 0
N1toam N1.Istatus = TimeO∧ N1.Amonitor = true
N1to¬am N1.Istatus = TimeO∧ N1.Amonitor = false
hN3nsis hN3nsi ∨ hN3nss
hN4nris hN4nri ∨ hN4nrs
hardf hN3nsf ∨ hN4nrf ∨ hN6nsf
hardi hN3nsi ∨ hN4nri ∨ hN6nsi
hardis hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris ∨ hN6nsi ∨ hN6nss
softi sN2nsi
softf sN2nsf
allhsf hN3nsf ∧ hN4nrf ∧ hN6nsf ∧ sN2nsf
anyhsf hardf ∨ softf
anyhsi hardi ∨ softi
anyf N1smf ∨ TKwdf ∨ anyhsf
The ISPL code containing the global and initial states is updated to include the atomic propositions and initial states for 
hn4nr fault injection agent as follows:
Evaluation
.
.
hN4nr_injecting if hN4nr.status = fault_i;
hN4nr_faulty if !hN4nr.status = not_fault;
hN4nr_stopped if hN4nr.status = stop_i;
.
.
end Evaluation
InitStates
.
.
and (hN4nr.status = w_rstt
or hN4nr.status = not_fault)
.
.
end InitStates
The full mutated code can be found at [33].
6.5. Verifying fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability in the token ring protocol
We used the mutated ISPL program of the protocol and our speciﬁcation patterns to reason about fault tolerance, re-
coverability, and diagnosability in the token ring protocol. We performed preliminary veriﬁcation on the protocol to ensure 
that: 1) all the faults can enter a start and stop state; 2) Node 1 is the only active monitor; 3) Nodes 1 and 4 can reach a 
timeout state; 4) Nodes 3, 4, and 6 are the only nodes that can disconnect. These represent additional properties that we 
expected the system to satisfy. MCMAS veriﬁed all the speciﬁcations above and those discussed in the rest of this section 
in approximately 32 hours on an Intel Core 2 Quad 8400 2.66 GHz processor running a 2.6.32-33 Linux Kernel with 4 GB of 
memory. The number of reachable states for the mutated model was approximately 4.96 × 106.
To reason about the injected faults, we deﬁned a number of atomic propositions. These are reported in Table 8 where 
Proposition is the name of the atomic proposition and Condition is the condition making the atomic proposition true. As 
naming conventions, hard indicates any hard fault; soft indicates a soft fault; allhs indicates all hard and soft faults; anyhs
indicates any hard or soft fault; f is the faulty persistence; i is the injecting persistence; s is the stopped persistence; is
is either the injecting or stopped persistence; d indicates that a node is disconnected; sb indicates that a node has started 
sending beacons; to indicates a node has timed out; am indicates that the node is the active monitor. The injected persistence 
is the same as the injecting persistence for all faults as the fault is injected constantly.
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mental to our study. The following speciﬁcations stipulate that at some point a message is sent; at some point under faulty 
behaviour an acknowledgement is received; at some point under non-faulty behaviour an acknowledgement is received.
AF(msgsent)
AF(anyf → recack)
AF(¬anyf → recack)
MCMAS reported the ﬁrst and third speciﬁcations as true, and the second as false. This establishes that messages are always 
sent at some point, and acknowledgements are always received under non-faulty behaviour, but are not always received 
under faulty behaviour.
We now turn our attention to investigating properties of the token ring protocol under faulty behaviour. The following 
speciﬁcation (an instantiation of Formula (4.1)) states that when there is no active monitor on the ring, then eventually an 
active monitor is re-established.
AG(¬am → AF(am))
MCMAS reported this speciﬁcation as false and reported a counterexample showing a system run of 330 global states 
(approximately 550 kb) in which a token circulates without an active monitor on the ring. This result allows us to determine 
that the faulty behaviour prevents the ring from correctly designating an active monitor when one is absent. To further 
investigate this behaviour, consider the following speciﬁcation (corresponding to Formula (4.2)) stating that if Node 1 cannot 
exhibit the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor when it is an active monitor, and there is no active monitor on 
the ring, then always at some point in the future there is an active monitor on the ring.
AG((¬N1smf ∧ ¬am) → AF(am))
MCMAS veriﬁed the speciﬁcation as true. This and the previous speciﬁcation establish that, in the absence of active monitor 
messages, the ring has no tolerance to the faulty active monitor behaviour since there is no mechanism to let standby 
monitors know when there is no active monitor on the ring. However, this speciﬁcation also conﬁrms that under this faulty 
behaviour the ring operates correctly in terms of establishing an operational active monitor.
The following speciﬁcation states that whenever a token has a destination, then always at some point in the future the 
token becomes free.
AG(¬token_free → AF(token_free))
MCMAS reported this speciﬁcation to be false and showed a counterexample that indicates a system run of 476 global states 
(approximately 800 kb) in which an orphaned token repeatedly circulates the ring. Thus, the faulty behaviour prevents the 
ring from correctly freeing a token whenever it has a destination.
We can look more closely at this behaviour by using the following speciﬁcation based on Formula (4.2) which states that 
if Node 1 cannot exhibit the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor when it is an active monitor or the token 
destination is not corrupted, and a token has a destination, always at some point in the future the token becomes free.
AG((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬TKwd f ∧ ¬token_free) → AF(token_free))
MCMAS veriﬁed this speciﬁcation as true. This signiﬁes that without a mechanism to let standby monitors know when there 
is no active monitor on the ring, the combination of a missing active monitor and an orphaned token prevents a token from 
being correctly freed.
The next speciﬁcation of interest we analysed (matching Formula (4.1)) stipulates that the ring never enters the beacon-
ing process.
AG(¬beaconing)
MCMAS found this speciﬁcation to be false, and a counterexample of 128 global states (approximately 216 kb) was generated 
in which the status of Node 4 is beaconing. Thus, the faulty behaviour causes the ring to enter the beaconing process.
To investigate the beaconing process further, we can use a speciﬁcation (corresponding to Formula (4.2)) stating that if 
there is not a hard fault on the ring, the ring does not enter the beaconing process.
AG(¬hardf → ¬beaconing)
The speciﬁcation was veriﬁed as true, which means that hard faults are the cause of beaconing. To investigate the faulty 
behaviour further, we can check whether any of the node timers ever reaches zero.
AG(¬timeout)
MCMAS found a counterexample to this formula showing a system run of 66 global states (approximately 115 kb) in 
which the active monitor enters a timeout state.
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faulty behaviour, one of the nodes enters a timeout state.
To investigate hard and soft faults further consider the following speciﬁcations (corresponding to Formula (4.2)). They 
state that: if there is not a hard fault on the ring, then none of the node timers ever reaches zero; if there is not a soft fault 
on the ring, then none of the node timers ever reaches zero; if there are no hard and soft faults on the ring, then none of 
the node timers ever reaches zero.
AG(¬hardf → ¬timeout)
AG(¬softf → ¬timeout)
AG((¬hard f ∧ ¬soft f ) → ¬timeout)
MCMAS reported the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations to be false and provided counterexamples of system runs with a length of 61 
global states (approximately 100 kb), and 66 global states (approximately 115 kb) respectively, demonstrating that the active 
monitor enters a timeout state. However, the last speciﬁcation was veriﬁed as true signifying that both hard and soft faults 
cause a node on the ring to timeout.
To illustrate how soft and hard faults affect the nature of the fault detection, consider the following speciﬁcations. They 
stipulate that: if there is not an active monitor fault and soft fault on the ring, then no standby monitor ever times out; if 
there is not an active monitor fault nor hard fault on the ring, then no standby monitors ever time out.
AG((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬soft f ) → ¬timeoutnoam)
AG((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬hard f ) → ¬timeoutnoam)
The ﬁrst speciﬁcation was reported to be false and a counterexample was given showing with a length of 98 global states 
(approximately 165 kb) in which Node 4 enters a timeout state. The second speciﬁcation was veriﬁed as true. We conclude 
that hard faults can cause standby monitors to time out whereas soft faults only cause the active monitor to timeout.
In summary, by using Formulas (4.1) and (4.2) we have shown that: 1) without a mechanism to let the standby monitors 
know when there is no active monitor on the ring, the ring cannot correctly designate an active monitor and free orphaned 
tokens; 2) hard faults cause the ring to enter the beaconing process; 3) soft faults cause the active monitor to timeout; 
4) hard faults cause the standby monitors to timeout. We now proceed to consider intermittent faults.
Verifying aspects of tolerance to intermittent faults The following speciﬁcation, based on Formula (4.3), states that if the active 
monitor has exhibited the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor, then there is no active monitor on the ring.
AG(N1sms → ¬am)
MCMAS reported this speciﬁcation to be false and provided a counterexample showing a system run with a length of 225 
global states (approximately 378 kb). The result appears counter-intuitive since one may expect that if an active monitor has 
become a standby monitor, then there will never be an active monitor due to the omission of messages informing standby 
monitors that there is no active monitor on the ring. However, the counterexample reported that Node 1 became a standby 
monitor when N1sm occurred, Node 1 then later became an active monitor after hN3ns occurred. The counterexample also 
showed other nodes in the ring claiming to become active monitors.
We further examine this behaviour by using a speciﬁcation (corresponding to Formula (4.4)) which states that if the 
active monitor has exhibited the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor and there no hard or soft faults can occur, 
then there is no active monitor on the ring.
AG((N1sms ∧ ¬anyhsf ) → ¬am)
MCMAS veriﬁed this speciﬁcation as true. This indicates that hard and soft faults may cause an active monitor to become 
designated in the absence of active monitor messages.
We can further demonstrate this is the case by checking a speciﬁcation based on Formula (4.3), which states that if the 
active monitor has exhibited the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor and any of the hard or soft faults are 
currently occurring, then always at some point in the future there will be an active monitor on the ring.
AG((N1sms ∧ anyhsi) → AF(am))
The result of checking this speciﬁcation is true. The conclusion from the above investigation is that if a hard or soft fault 
occurs, then an active monitor becomes designated even in the absence of active monitor messages.
6.6. Verifying aspects of recoverability
To reason about recovery, consider the speciﬁcation below, based on Formula (4.6), stating that whenever any hard or 
soft faults are injected and a message has been sent, then always at some point in the future the sender will receive an 
acknowledgement.
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Speciﬁcations of diagnosability for the token ring protocol.
A AG((¬N1smf ∧ N1toam) → KN1(hN6nsf ))) T (4.9)
B AG((¬N1smf ∧ allf ∧ N1toam) → T (4.10)
(KN1(anyhsi) ∧ ¬KN1(hardi) ∧ ¬KN1(softi)))
C ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬anyhsi) U (anyhsi ∧ ¬AF(KN1(anyhsi)))) T (4.11)
D ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬anyhsi) U (anyhsi ∧ ¬AF(EALL(anyhsi)))) F (4.12)
E ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬DALL(anyhsi)) U (DALL(anyhsi) ∧ ¬AF(EALL(anyhsi)))) F (4.13)
F AG((¬N1smf ∧ allhsf ∧ N4sb) → T (4.10)
(KN4(hN3nsis ∧ hN4nris) ∧ ¬KN4(hN3nsis) ∧ ¬KN4(hN4nris)))
G AG((¬N1smf ∧ allhsf ∧ N3d) → T (4.10)
(KN3(KN4(hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris) ∧ ¬KN4(hN3nsis) ∧ ¬KN4(hN4nris))))
H ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬hN3nsi) U (hN3nsi ∧ ¬AF(KN4(hN3nsis ∨ hN4nri)))) T (4.11)
I ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬hN4nri) U (hN4nri ∧ ¬AF(KN4(hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris)))) T (4.11)
J ¬E((¬N1smf ∧ ¬DALL(hN3nsi ∨ hN4nri)) U F (4.13)
(DALL(hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris) ∧ ¬AF(EALL(hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris))))
K ¬E((¬N1smf ∧ ¬DALL(hN3nsi ∨ hN4nri)) U T (4.13)
(DALL((hN3nsis ∨ hN4nris)) ∧ ¬AF(EALL(hardis))))
L ¬E((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬EALL(hardis)) U (EALL(hardis) ∧ ¬AF(CALL(hardis)))) F (4.13)
AG((anyhsi ∧msgsent) → AF(recack))
MCMAS reported this speciﬁcation as false and provided a counterexample showing a system run of 300 global states 
(approximately 504 kb) in which a token circulates the ring without an acknowledgement reaching the sender. This means 
that, in the presence of all the faults here analysed, the ring will not necessarily deliver all acknowledgements to messages.
To try and isolate the issue in more detail, we tested the following speciﬁcation (corresponding to Formula (4.8)) ex-
pressing that if an active monitor does not exhibit the faulty behaviour of becoming a standby monitor, and if a token is 
never orphaned, then whenever any hard or soft fault is injected and a message has been sent, then always at some point 
in the future the sender will receive an acknowledgement.
AG((¬N1sm f ∧ ¬TKwd f ∧ anyhsi ∧msgsent) → AF(recack))
The result of checking this speciﬁcation is true.
These results demonstrate that the combination of an orphaned token and active monitor incorrectly becoming a standby 
monitor prevents an acknowledgement from always being delivered. Thus, the considerations above highlight the require-
ment for informing the standby monitors whenever there is no active monitor on the ring.
6.7. Verifying aspects of diagnosability
We now report the results we obtained while verifying diagnosability in the token ring protocol using speciﬁcations that 
rely on the epistemic states of the nodes in the system. The speciﬁcations we used are given in Table 9, along with the 
result that MCMAS returns when checking the formula, and the corresponding diagnosability speciﬁcation pattern used to 
deﬁne the speciﬁcation. In our analysis, we omit the scenario in which the active monitor becomes a standby monitor, as 
active monitor messages are required in the diagnosis process.
Speciﬁcation A states that whenever Node 1 is not an active monitor and enters a timeout state, then it knows that 
there is a hard fault on Node 6. Speciﬁcation B states that whenever all hard and soft faults occur in a run of the system, if 
Node 1 is an active monitor and enters a timeout state, then it knows that there is a fault occurring on the ring, but does 
not know whether it is a soft or hard fault.
To reason about the diagnosability without referring to a diagnosis property, Speciﬁcation C states that it is not possible 
that a fault occurs without eventually Node 1 (the active monitor) knowing that a fault has occurred. Similar speciﬁcations 
can be obtained for the other nodes. Speciﬁcation D expresses the fact that a fault cannot occur without this eventually 
becoming distributed knowledge amongst all nodes. Speciﬁcation E concerns the transfer of knowledge of faults: it states 
that a fault cannot be distributedly known without eventually all of the nodes knowing this. Again, similar speciﬁcations 
referring to individual nodes, faults or subsets of either can be checked if required.
To express the diagnosability of the beaconing process, Speciﬁcation F expresses that whenever all hard and soft faults 
occur in a run of the system, if Node 4 enters a state where it has begun sending beacons, then it knows that either it is 
not receiving tokens or Node 3 is not sending tokens, but does not know speciﬁcally which of these faults has occurred. 
Speciﬁcation G states that whenever all hard and soft faults occur in a run of the system, if Node 3 becomes disconnected, 
then it knows that Node 4 knows that either Node 3 is either not sending tokens, or Node 4 is not receiving tokens, but 
does not know speciﬁcally which of these nodes is not sending or receiving tokens.
To verify the diagnosability of the beaconing process without referencing a diagnosis property, Speciﬁcations H and I 
state that it is not possible that Node 3 is unable to send tokens or Node 4 cannot receive tokens without eventually 
Node 4 knowing that one of these faults has occurred. Speciﬁcation J states that it is not possible that there is distributed 
knowledge of one of these faults without eventually all of the nodes knowing that one of these faults has occurred. Similarly, 
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of the nodes knowing that a hard fault has occurred. Speciﬁcation L states that it is not possible that all of the nodes know 
a hard fault has occurred without eventually becoming common knowledge amongst all of the nodes that a hard fault has 
occurred.
The veriﬁcation results for these formulas are reported in the table. From these we can infer the following properties: 
1) A standby monitor can diagnose a fault on its nearest upstream neighbour and an active monitor can diagnose any hard 
and soft fault on the ring; 2) The protocol is not capable of translating distributed knowledge of a fault into everyone 
knowing the fault; 3) Not every node on the ring comes to know about a fault since the same mechanism that is used to 
diagnose soft faults is used to establish the ring when it initialises, and the standby monitors are not able to differentiate 
between initialisation and diagnosis of soft faults; 4) The beaconing process allows a node to diagnose and resolve a hard 
fault that has occurred between itself or its nearest upstream neighbour; 5) In contrast to soft faults, the knowledge of 
the occurrence of a hard fault is propagated during the beaconing process so that the nodes of the ring can co-ordinate 
during the beaconing process; 6) Hard faults do not become common knowledge amongst the nodes as this would require 
a mechanism for broadcasting knowledge of the fault simultaneously to all nodes. These properties are not discussed in 
the original token ring speciﬁcation [29] and contribute to our understanding of the protocol, its resilience to faults, and 
diagnosability properties.
7. Related work
In previous work we have put forward a preliminary methodology for reasoning about fault-injection and diagnosability 
in the context of MAS [34,35]. The present article consolidates and expands in a systematic way the material published 
there. The methodology was also further applied to a usecase from the autonomous system domain not discussed here [36].
From a theoretical point of view, various notions of faults have received considerable attention in the distributed systems 
community and in knowledge-based approaches. Speciﬁcally, “crash failure”, “omission failure” and “Byzantine failure” have 
been deﬁned and analysed, particularly in the context of protocol analysis and fault analysis [2]. The notions of model 
mutation discussed in this paper are inspired from these and extend them by considering more sophisticated variants. The 
fundamental difference is not the generality of the approach but its different overall emphasis and objective. For example, 
in the knowledge-based analysis of Byzantine agreement [37–39], as well as in other protocols, the objective is to establish 
whether epistemic notions, notably common knowledge, can be established in entire class of protocols, e.g., agreement 
schema such as the attacking generals. Instead, here we are not concerned with what epistemic states some protocols can 
achieve but on a methodology that can be used to decide whether particular temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations hold in 
the presence of faults, and whether epistemic properties representing diagnosability are realised in the concrete MAS under 
analysis.
Much closer to the techniques here presented and a direct inspiration for our work is previous research, described below, 
on safety-analysis methods combining fault-injection with model checking for the veriﬁcation of safety-critical systems [16,9,
11,17]. In this literature a wealth of mature technologies have been developed to assess the robustness of systems. However, 
these are limited to temporal speciﬁcations, whereas here we are concerned with MAS, which are typically speciﬁed by 
means of a variety of modal logics, notably epistemic logic as we do here. Furthermore, these approaches do not consider 
the automated analysis of diagnosability, an aspect here explored.
The techniques used so far involve the popular model checker NuSMV [9], process algebras such as CCS/Meije [16,11], 
and the commercial SCADE tool by Esterel Technologies coupled with the SCADE Design Veriﬁer model checker [17]. Our 
classiﬁcation of failure modes is based upon the faults deﬁned in [9,17].
In [9] an integrated tool for injecting faults into a system model deﬁned in NuSMV is applied to verify safety-critical 
avionics systems. The tool automatically mutates the NuSMV code according to a library of failure modes. The tool provides 
a library of temporal logic formulas for safety requirements whose deﬁnition is pattern based. Due to the high level of 
automation of the tool in specifying safety requirements, injecting faults, and producing fault trees, the tool is successful in 
improving the usability for non-experts in formal veriﬁcation. However, the tool is limited to reactive systems speciﬁed in 
temporal logic and speciﬁcations for verifying diagnosability are not considered.
Related to this, is the extensive work within the EU project Compass [40] aimed at providing a model-based approach 
to systems co-engineering and tools to identify critical faults in systems for the aerospace domain. Within this project not 
only tools for assessing functional correctness via model checking have been developed [41], but also fault-injection and 
dependability analysis techniques have been put forward [42,43]. The emphasis of this work is different from ours. Firstly, 
it mostly targets hardware and reactive systems for space exploration; therefore it is tailored to temporal speciﬁcations in 
a probabilistic setting. In contrast we here focus on MAS characterised by epistemic speciﬁcations. Secondly, the Compass
project is concerned with actual deployment in the aerospace domain, whereas here we intended to use temporal-epistemic 
speciﬁcations as a unifying formalism for both the initial MAS speciﬁcations and to express diagnosability.
In [17] faults are injected into SCADE for a model of a wheel brake system. Veriﬁcation is performed on the faulty model 
by reasoning about the faults using temporal logic. Speciﬁcations are included to check whether safety properties hold under 
faulty conditions. These are speciﬁc to the faulty model and not generically extended from veriﬁcation of the correct model. 
The fault injection is not automatic which limits the level of automation of the tool.
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such as CCS by applying special-purpose process operators. Similarly, in [16] a modelling approach for formalising fault 
tolerant systems is proposed for the CCS/Meije process algebra and model checking applied to verify fault tolerance and 
recoverability. The proposed formalisms are not suitable for verifying MAS, and the work is not extended to provide a 
practically usable tool.
The previous work on analysing diagnosability considers discrete event systems [14,44], and model based diagnosis 
systems [13,45]. The main focus of the work in [45,14,44] is the formalisation of the diagnosability problem and less 
attention is given to the practicality of the proposed algorithms for analysis. This makes the techniques diﬃcult to apply 
for non-experts in formal veriﬁcation. Additionally, some of the assumptions made in some of the above literature entail a 
heavy computational cost. For example, [14] assumes a perfect recall semantics, whereas our setting is only observational.
A practical approach to verifying diagnosability using temporal logic model checking is given in [13]. In this line, a cou-
pled twin model of the diagnosis system must be constructed so that diagnosability can be expressed as a temporal 
speciﬁcation. This implies that the modelling component of the technique is signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult for non-experts 
to perform in comparison to injecting automatically faulty behaviour. The practicality of this approach is not examined for 
systems in which distributed diagnosis is present. In contrast with all the lines of research cited above, our contribution 
employs concepts based on epistemic logic to deﬁne notions of diagnosability. In the setting of epistemic logic we here 
adopt, the knowledge of an agent (e.g., the knowledge of a fault or of a recoverability property) does not refer to what 
the agent knows explicitly, but, instead, expresses whether the agent in question has suﬃcient information to deduce with 
certainty, if given unlimited resources, whether a given property holds. While this notion does not provide an algorithmic 
procedure for computing the knowledge of the agents, it has nonetheless been shown useful as it provides a bound for the 
knowledge of the agents in an idealised setting. The diagnosability properties we here explore are to be interpreted in the 
same way.
After the research reported here was conducted, [46] put forward a notion of diagnosability and maximality based on 
epistemic logic. The setup includes temporal operators to reason about the past and adopts a synchronous, perfect-recall 
semantics for the epistemic operator representing the diagnoser. Checking perfect-recall knowledge operators is undecidable 
in some settings and has exponential complexity in others. We are not aware of any existing model checker supporting 
epistemic modalities with perfect recall semantics for more than 2 agents. While the approaches share the theme of a 
knowledge-based representation of the diagnoser, they differ in the technical details; moreover while [46] considers a single 
diagnoser we are here concerned with distributed diagnosis. Also recently, [47] deﬁned various notions of diagnosability in 
terms of probabilistic and epistemic properties of systems. Given we do not employ probabilities in our setup the approaches 
cannot readily be compared.
8. Conclusions
In this article we presented an automated approach to verifying fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability in MAS. 
We put forward a methodology for mutating MAS models in order to produce systems exhibiting faulty behaviour, and 
deﬁned a library of temporal and epistemic speciﬁcations to reason about the correct and faulty behaviours of the mutated 
system. A tool was developed and paired with a MAS model checker to help engineers study faults and diagnosability 
properties automatically through model checking the resulting models. The methodology was evaluated on the token ring 
protocol, a networking protocol that incorporates mechanisms utilising distributed diagnosis to facilitate recovery from 
faults.
Contribution. While veriﬁcation of MAS through model checking temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations has received con-
siderable attention in the AI and MAS communities recently [24,23,19], much remains to be done in terms of developing 
robust methodologies for analysing properties of MAS operating in degraded circumstances. Being able to validate aspects 
of fault-tolerance, recovery and correct diagnosability is essential in key MAS application areas such as autonomous vehicles 
as, in the future, formal techniques may provide a basis for the certiﬁcation of these systems. In this context, we see the 
contribution of this paper as threefold. Firstly, the fault-injection technique developed here is model-based and independent 
of the speciﬁcations used, we employed it on models on which generic temporal-epistemic speciﬁcations (those typically 
used to analyse agent systems) can be checked. This enables us to assess MAS in the presence of faults against MAS-based 
speciﬁcations. Secondly, the notion of diagnosability has been formalised in temporal-epistemic languages so that diagnos-
ability analysis can be conducted through model checking mutated models and diagnosability mechanisms of MAS can be 
veriﬁed. Thirdly, an open-source toolkit has been released to assist with analysing the fault-tolerance and diagnosability of 
autonomous systems in the presence of a large class of possible faults. These three aspects contribute to our long term 
ambition of helping engineers to certify the correctness of autonomous agents.
Limitations. The analysis conducted on the token ring protocol only applies to the speciﬁc conﬁguration considered and 
the faults injected. It is not intended to certify the protocol in question. Doing so would require parametric veriﬁcation and 
abstraction on the topology of the network. This is in principle possible, but it is not the objective of the scenario presented. 
The application discussed is meant to be an illustration of the methodology put forward that involves experimenting with 
degraded conditions of interest to the engineer.
As with any approach based on model checking, the state-space explosion remains the bottleneck of any model checking 
call. Model checkers such as MCMAS mitigate this problem by means of symbolic representations of the state-space, typically 
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than what is feasible with explicit approaches, state-spaces much larger than those discussed in the scenario analysed here 
become challenging for plain BDD-based approaches. To limit these diﬃculties a number of methodologies are available 
including predicate abstraction and symmetry reduction.
Future work. We intend to use the current approach to verify aspects of fault tolerance and diagnosability in autonomous 
systems. Additional timing options for re-occurring faults will be added to the fault injection agent in order to allow for the 
broadening of our diagnosability speciﬁcation patterns to reason about them. We envision the extension of the toolkit to 
allow for user deﬁned mutation rules and automatic generation of typical fault tolerance, recoverability, and diagnosability 
speciﬁcations.
We conducted the analysis in the context of the BDD-based model checker MCMAS. The methodology was instantiated 
on concrete ISPL ﬁles. On large MAS this forces us to use ISPL generators to produce the model of the system. A promising 
alternative is to use a parameterised version of ISPL [48–50] so that the analysis cold be based on templates instead.
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